



















enterprise.	Greek	philosophers	 thought	of	 themselves	as	partaking	 in	a	contest	
(agôn)	 and	of	 their	 fellow-philosophers	as	opponents	 to	be	bested.	Within	 this	
context,	exchanges	between	philosophers	tended	to	take	the	shape	of	polemics	–	
that	is,	aggressive	attacks	on	both	the	position	and	the	person	of	the	opponent	–	
rather	 than	 of	 constructive	 dialogues.	 Good	 illustrations	 of	 this	 point	 are	 the	
early	Presocratics	Xenophanes	and	Heraclitus,	who	both	vehemently	attack	such	
figures	of	note	as	Homer,	Hesiod,	and	Pythagoras	in	an	attempt	to	make	a	name	
for	 themselves.	1	Philosophical	 polemic	 gained	 extra	 momentum	 from	 the	
	
1	For	 Heraclitus	 as	 an	 early	 polemicist,	 cf.	 for	 example	 H.	 Stauffer,	 “Polemik,”	 in	 Historisches	
Wörterbuch	der	Rhetorik,	vol.	6,	Must–Pop,	ed.	Gert	Ueding	(Berlin:	De	Gruyter,	2003),	1403–15,	
here	 1405.	 For	 Heraclitus’s	 sharp	 criticism	 of	 other	 Greek	 poets	 and	 intellectuals,	 see,	 for	
example,	Heraclitus	Hermann	Diels	and	Walther	Kranz,	Die	Fragmente	der	Vorsokratiker	(Berlin:	
Weidmann,	 196411)	 22	 B	 42:	 “Heraclitus	 said	 that	 Homer	 deserved	 it	 to	 be	 driven	 out	 of	 the	
competitions	 (ek	tôn	agônôn)	 and	beaten	 and	Archilochus	 likewise”;	 and	 further	A	22	 (against	
Homer);	22	B40	(against	Hesiod,	Pythagoras,	Xenophanes,	and	Hecataeus);	B57	(against	Hesiod);	














Hellenistic	 period	 onwards,	 when	 philosophers	 began	 to	 organise	 themselves	
into	schools	that	competed	with	each	other	for	pupils.	Polemics	proved	a	useful	
tool	for	self-promotion	and	hence	for	luring	potential	students	away	from	other	
schools.	 Somewhat	 paradoxically,	 given	 its	 importance,	 the	 ancients	 did	 not	
theorise	about	polemical	discourse.	It	is	not	discussed,	for	example,	in	the	many	
ancient	 treatises	 about	 rhetoric.	 Even	 though	 the	 modern	 word	 polemic	 is	
derived	 from	the	ancient	Greek	words	polemos	 (“war”)	and	polemikos	 (“related	
to	war”),	these	words	are	hardly	ever	used	in	ancient	texts	to	denote	polemics.2	
A	student	of	ancient	polemical	texts	thus	has	to	take	recourse	to	modern	literary	
theories	 about	 polemics.	 In	 the	 present	 contribution,	 I	 intend	 to	 discuss	 the	
oration	of	the	emperor	Julian	(Oration	7)	against	the	Cynic	Heraclius	on	myths,	
with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 model	 of	 polemical	 discourse	 that	 has	 been	 developed	 by	
Jürgen	 Stenzel,3	and	 to	 which	 André	 Laks	 has	 recently	 drawn	 the	 attention	 of	
students	of	ancient	philosophy	in	a	stimulating	essay	introducing	a	volume	about	
the	role	of	polemics	in	ancient	philosophy.4	
Julian’s	 speech	 is	 a	 response	 to	 another	 speech	 that	 was	 delivered	 in	 the	
spring	 of	 362	 in	 Constantinople	 by	 the	 aforementioned	 Cynic	 philosopher	
Heraclius	before	an	audience	that	consisted	of	Julian	and	other	members	of	the	
imperial	 court.	 If	 we	 are	 to	 believe	 Julian’s	 no	 doubt	 biased	 summary	 of	 the	
	
The	 Cambridge	 Companion	 to	 Early	 Greek	 Philosophy,	 ed.	 A.A.	 Long,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	1999),	332–62,	here	352–53.	
2	For	the	absence	of	the	concept	of	polemic	in	antiquity,	see	Stauffer,	“Polemik,”	1403–06.	André	
Laks	 (“The	Continuation	 of	 Philosophy	by	Other	Means?”	 in	Strategies	of	Polemics	in	Greek	and	
Roman	Philosophy,	 ed.	 Sharon	Weisser	 and	 Naly	 Thaler	 [Leiden:	 Brill,	 2016],	 16–30,	 here	 17)	
likewise	observes	 that	 the	Greek	words	polemos	and	polemikos	hardly	ever	apply	 to	 literary	or	
philosophical	polemics.	As	an	exception,	he	quotes	Eusebius,	Preparation	for	the	Gospel	14.8.10,	




that	 is	 quoted	by	Eusebius	 in	Preparation	for	the	Gospel	 (14.5.10–6.14),	 portrays	 the	polemical	
exchange	between	 the	Academic	Arcesilaus	 and	 the	Stoic	Zeno	as	 a	Homeric	battle.	Below,	we	
shall	 find	 a	 similar	 comparison	 to	 Homeric	 battles	 in	 descriptions	 of	 polemical	 situations.	
Admittedly,	Arcesilaus	is	another	sceptic	philosopher.	In	the	same	fragment,	however,	Numenius	
compares	 the	 polemics	 of	 Cephisodorus,	 a	 pupil	 of	 Isocrates,	 against	 Aristotle	 with	 warfare.	
Cephisodrus	 got	 angry	 with	 Aristotle	 because	 the	 latter	 had	 criticised	 his	 master,	 Isocrates.	
Cephisodorus,	however,	mixed	up	Aristotle’s	philosophy	with	 that	of	Plato.	As	a	 result,	 “he	did	
not	 fight	 (machomenos)	with	 the	 person	 against	whom	he	waged	war/polemicized	 (epolemei),	
but	fought	(emacheto)	against	whom	he	did	not	wish	to	wage	war/polemicize	(polemein).”	




speech	 –	 which	 itself	 has	 not	 been	 preserved	 –	 it	 revolved	 around	 a	 myth	 of	
Heraclius’s	 own	making	 about	 Zeus	 and	 Pan.	 To	 his	 public,	 it	must	 have	 been	
clear	 that	 in	 this	myth,	Zeus	represented	Heraclius	himself,	whereas	Pan	stood	
for	the	emperor	Julian.	There	must	have	been	more	than	a	slight	hint	of	mockery	
involved.	Julian,	now	that	he	had	become	the	sole	ruler	of	the	Roman	world,	tried	
to	 undo	 the	 politics	 of	 his	 uncle	 Constantine	 and	 Constantine’s	 successor,	
Constantius,	which	had	made	Christianity	the	official	religion	of	the	empire	at	the	
expense	 of	 the	 traditional	 Graeco-Roman	 pagan	 cult.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 his	
programme	of	pagan	restoration,	Julian	presented	himself	both	as	a	scion	of	the	
sun-god,	 King	 Helios,	 and	 as	 a	 Neo-Platonic	 philosopher	 –	 in	 particular,	 as	 a	
follower	 of	 Iamblichus	 of	 Apamea	 and	 his	 version	 of	 Neo-Platonism,	 which	
combined	philosophy	with	pagan	religious	rituals.	As	part	of	this	self-fashioning,	
Julian	 sported	 a	 philosophical	 beard,	 which	 attracted	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 and	
ridicule.	 Heraclius’s	 speech	 is	 unfortunately	 lost	 to	 us.	 By	 presenting	 Julian	 as	
Pan	–	the	least	attractive	god	in	the	classical	pantheon,	because	he	combined	the	
looks	 of	 a	 human	 being	 with	 those	 of	 a	 hairy	 goat	 –	 Heraclius	 presumably	
intended	 to	 poke	 fun	 at	 both	 Julian’s	 claims	 about	 his	 divine	 ancestry	 and	 his	
unkempt	appearance.5	
Julian’s	 extremely	 hostile	 response	 may	 have	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 to	 both	
Julian’s	 public	 and	 to	 Heraclius	 in	 particular.	 The	 traditional	 role	 of	 the	 Cynic	
philosopher	was	that	of	the	court	jester	to	the	high	and	mighty.	One	has	only	to	
think	 of	 the	 famous	 anecdote	 about	 the	 Cynic	 Diogenes	 asking	 Alexander	 the	
Great	 to	 stand	 out	 of	 his	 sunlight.	 The	 person	 at	 the	 receiving	 end	 of	 Cynic	
mockery	was	supposed	to	take	it	graciously,	as	in	fact	Alexander	reportedly	did.	







Press,	 2012],	 109–12)	 argues	 that	 Heraclius	 compared	 Julian	 to	 Pan	 as	 an	 allusion	 to	 Julian’s	
rather	restricted	sex	life.	After	the	death	of	his	wife	in	360,	Julian	remained	ostensibly	unmarried	
in	 order	 to	 devote	 himself	 to	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 empire.	 Pan	 was	 the	 god	 who	 had	





on	 to	 describe	 in	 some	 detail	 when	 and	 how	 philosophers	 should	 compose	
myths.	 He	 concludes	 his	 speech	 with	 a	 myth	 of	 his	 own	making,	 in	 which	 he	
presents	himself	as	a	man	on	a	divine	mission.	
In	his	model	of	polemics,	which	can	be	presented	as	a	pyramid	(see	figure	1),	
Jürgen	 Stenzel	 distinguishes	 between	 four	 elements:	 (1)	 the	 polemical	 subject,	
who	aggressively	attacks	(2)	a	polemical	object	on	(3)	a	polemical	theme	in	front	
of	(4)	an	audience	(which	Stenzel	refers	to	as	polemische	Instanz).6	The	intention	
of	 the	 polemical	 subject	 is	 to	 persuade	 the	 audience	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	








In	 the	 present	 case,	 this	 corresponds	 to	 (1)	 Julian,	 who	 attacks	 (2)	 Heraclius	
about	 (3)	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 (ab)use	 of	 myths	 in	 front	 of	 (4)	 an	 audience	 of	





Stenzel	 quite	 rightly	 stresses	 both	 the	 aggressive	 and	 the	 public	 nature	 of	
polemics:	the	goal	of	the	polemical	subject	is	to	destroy	the	polemical	object	and	
his	position	–	hence	the	title	of	Stenzel’s	essay,	“Rhetorischer	Manichaïsmus.”	In	
a	recent	paper,	André	Laks	raises	 the	 intriguing	question	of	whether,	 if	 such	 is	





plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 Julian’s	 oration.	 Julian	 uses	 the	 public	 nature	 of	
polemics	 as	 a	 suitable	 platform	 to	 advertise	 his	 own	 religious-philosophical	
program.	However,	in	doing	so,	he	lays	himself	bare	to	the	accusation	that	he	is	
not	a	real	philosopher,	precisely	because	he	engages	in	polemics.	My	suggestion	






the	 subject	 of	 a	 philosophical	 polemic	 may	 feel	 the	 need	 to	 justify	 his	
undertaking	at	the	outset.	In	this	section,	I	suggest	that,	in	the	Platonic	tradition,	
there	was	 some	 sort	 of	 format	 for	how	 to	do	 this,	 and	 that	 Julian	here	 follows	
that	 format.	 I	shall	demonstrate	this	by	comparing	Julian’s	opening	passages	to	






and	 was	 infamous	 for	 his	 harsh	 polemical	 treatises,	 in	 which	 he	 sought	 to	
establish	 the	 superiority	of	Epicurus’s	philosophy	by	 attacking	 any	other	 great	
philosopher	 –	 Socrates,	 Plato,	 and	 Parmenides	 included.	 Some	 three	 centuries	
	
7	Laks,	“The	Continuation	of	Philosophy.”	
later,	 Plutarch	 thought	 it	 necessary	 to	 write	 a	 reply	 to	 Colotes.	 In	 the	
introduction	to	this	work,	he	informs	his	readers	how	this	came	about.	One	day,	
Plutarch	 and	 his	 friends	 were	 listening	 to	 one	 of	 Colotes’s	 books	 being	 read	
aloud:	
	














Look	 to	 it	 then	 and	 consider	what	 defence	 you	will	make	 against	 the	
man.”	Aristodemus	replied:	“But	you	know	how	Plato,	when	incensed	at	
his	 servant,	 did	 not	 beat	 him	 personally	 but	 told	 Speusippus	 to	 do	 it,	
saying	 that	 he	 himself	 was	 angry;	 do	 you	 too	 then	 take	 the	 fellow	 in	




mere	 thyrsus-bearer	 of	 Academic	 doctrine”).	 He	 calls	 for	 an	 appropriate	
response	to	Colotes’s	irreverent	attack	on	the	founding	fathers	of	the	Academy.	






Colotes,	 rather	 than	 to	 appoint	 one	 by	 lot,	 as	 had	happened	 in	 the	 Iliad,	when	
Hector	 challenged	 the	 Greeks	 to	 decide	 the	 war	 by	 means	 of	 a	 duel	 between	
himself	 and	 a	 Greek	 champion.	 On	 the	 advice	 of	 Nestor,	 the	 most	 prominent	
among	 the	Greek	heroes	cast	 lots	 to	decide	who	would	be	 that	 champion.	This	
turns	 out	 to	 be	 Ajax	 (cf.	 Iliad	 7.170–181).	 Plutarch	 then	 reminds	 Aristodemus	
that	 Nestor,	 who	 oversaw	 the	 lottery,	 was	 the	 most	 prudent	 of	 men,	 thus	
suggesting	that	Nestor	somehow	ensured	the	desired	outcome	(“the	lot	of	Ajax,	
that	 all	 desired”).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 Aristodemus	 insists	 on	 choosing	 a	
champion	 rather	 than	 selecting	one	by	 lot,	 Plutarch	 suggests	 that	Aristodemus	
might	best	do	 the	 job	himself.	 In	 that	case,	Aristodemus	would	play	 the	role	of	
Odysseus,	 another	 Greek	 hero	 reputed	 for	 his	 wisdom	 and,	 in	 the	 Platonic	
tradition,	often	interpreted	as	a	proto-Platonist.	
Aristodemus	elegantly	declines	Plutarch’s	invitation	to	do	so,	citing	his	anger	







fellow	 Epicureans	 claim	 to	 be	 the	 only	 true	 philosophers,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 a	
Platonist,	 they	 are	 fake	 philosophers,	 since	 they	 completely	 dissociate	
themselves	 from	 the	 entire	 philosophical	 tradition.	 Although	 justifiable,	
Aristodemus’s	anger	rules	him	out	as	a	candidate	to	reply	to	Colotes,	since	such	a	
reply	 requires	 a	 cool	 head.	He	 reminds	 his	 audience	 of	 the	 story	 of	 how	Plato	
himself,	when	he	got	angry	with	a	slave,	asked	his	nephew	Speusippus	to	punish	
him	in	his	stead,	precisely	because	he	was	in	the	grip	of	his	emotions.	It	is	thus	
that	he	passes	 the	 job	of	 refuting	Colotes	on	 to	Plutarch.	This	assignment	suits	
Plutarch.	As	an	instrument	of	Aristodemus’s	anger,	he	is	made	to	play	the	part	of	
Speusippus,	which	elevates	him	to	the	rank	of	number	two	in	the	pecking	order	
of	 the	group.	After	all,	 Speusippus	was	Plato’s	nephew	and	was	 to	 succeed	 the	
latter	as	head	of	the	Academy.	It	is	especially	relevant	in	this	context	that	we	are	
dealing	here	with	a	public	reading	of	Colotes’s	text:	there	are	others	present	to	
witness	Plutarch’s	 election	 to	 this	position	of	prominence.	The	public	 aspect	 is	
also	underscored	by	the	Homeric	colouring	of	the	passage.	In	the	Iliad,	the	duel	













The	 rhetorician	Diophanes	read	 a	 defence	 of	 Alcibiades	 in	 Plato’s	
Banquet	 in	which	he	asserted	that	a	pupil	 for	the	sake	of	advancing	 in	
the	study	of	virtue	should	submit	himself	to	carnal	intercourse	with	his	
master	if	the	master	desired	it.	Plotinus	repeatedly	started	up	to	leave	
the	 meeting,	 but	 restrained	 himself,	 and	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 lecture	
gave	me,	Porphyry,	 the	 task	of	writing	a	 refutation.	Diophanes	refused	
to	lend	me	his	manuscript,	and	I	depended	in	writing	my	refutation	on	
my	 memory	 of	 his	 arguments.	 When	 I	 read	 it	 before	 the	 same	
assembled	hearers	I	pleased	Plotinus	so	much	that	he	kept	on	quoting	




9	Pierre-Marie	Morel	 and	 Francesco	 Verde	 (“Le	 Contre	 Colotès	 de	 Plutarque	 et	 son	 Prologue,”	
Aitia	3	[2013]:	http://aitia.revues.org/602,	here	15),	 in	their	 instructive	analysis	of	the	present	
passage,	 identify	Plutarch	with	both	Nestor	 and	Ajax,	 but	 that	 seems	 to	me	 less	 likely.	Rather,	






Plato	 to	 justify	 debauchery.	 That	 much	 is	 perhaps	 to	 be	 expected	 from	 a	
rhetorician.	 As	 any	 reader	 of	 Plato	 knows,	 these	 rhetoricians	 and	 sophists	 are	
fake	 philosophers.	 Diophanes,	 like	 the	 Epicurean	 Colotes,	 uses	 philosophy	 to	
legitimate	 his	 pursuit	 of	 bodily	 pleasures.	 Plotinus,	 however,	 being	 a	 genuine	
philosopher,	does	not	allow	anger	to	get	the	better	of	him.	He	restrains	himself	
and	 leaves	 it	 to	 Porphyry	 to	 deal	with	 Diophanes,	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 special	
position	 Porphyry	 holds	within	 the	 school.	 Once	 again,	 the	 public	 character	 of	
the	 accession	 guarantees	 that	 Plotinus’s	 preference	 for	 Porphyry	 is	 noted	 by	
many.	The	verse	(Iliad	8.282)	with	which	Plotinus	encourages	Porphyry	is	taken	









when	 by	 invitation	we	 attended	 the	 lecture	 of	 a	 Cynic	whose	 barking	
was	neither	distinct	nor	noble;	but	he	was	crooning	myths	as	nurses	do,	
and	 even	 these	 he	 did	 not	 compose	 in	 any	 profitable	 fashion.	 For	 a	
moment	my	impulse	was	to	rise	and	break	up	the	meeting.	But	though	I	
had	 to	 listen	 as	 one	 does	 when	 Heracles	 and	 Dionysus	 are	 being	
caricatured	in	the	theatre	by	comic	poets,	I	bore	it	to	the	end,	not	for	the	
speaker’s	 sake	 but	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 audience,	 or	 rather,	 if	 I	 may	
presume	to	say	so,	it	was	still	more	for	my	own	sake,	so	that	I	might	not	
seem	to	be	moved	by	superstition	rather	 than	by	a	pious	and	rational	
sentiment	 and	 to	 be	 scared	 into	 flight	 by	 his	 miserable	 words	 like	 a	
timid	 dove.	 So	 I	 stayed	 and	 repeated	 to	 myself	 the	 famous	 line	 “Be	
patient	my	heart,	you	have	put	up	with	worse	things	in	the	past.”	Endure	





Heraclius	 is	 prompted	 by	 the	 sort	 of	 emotions	 that	 befit	 a	 philosopher.	 He	 is	
angry	 with	 Heraclius	 for	 the	 right	 reasons:	 by	 telling	 a	 sort	 of	 comical	 myth	
about	Zeus	and	Pan,	Heraclius	commits	an	act	of	blasphemy	 that	cannot	 fail	 to	
enrage	 the	pious	 Julian.	At	 the	 same	 time,	he	manages	 to	 control	his	 anger:	he	
sits	through	the	entire	event	and	only	replies	later,	thus	demonstrating	that	his	
misgivings	about	the	speech	are	pious	and	rational.	He	places	himself	in	the	role	




In	 one	 further	 respect,	 Julian’s	 case	 differs	 from	 those	 of	 Plutarch	 and	
Porphyry.	 The	 latter	 act	 at	 the	 instigation	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 their	 groups,	 thus	
marking	 them	 out	 as	 the	 trusted	 lieutenants	 of	 the	masters	 themselves.	 Here,	
such	a	master-figure	is	missing.	Julian	appears	to	be	acting	on	his	own	initiative.	
In	a	way,	this	raises	questions	about	Julian’s	philosophical	attitude.	As	we	have	
seen,	 the	 reason	 philosophical	 masters	 appointed	 someone	 to	 punish	 a	
wrongdoer	was	precisely	because	 they	did	not	want	 to	do	so	 themselves	 in	an	





Who	 is	 or	 are	 the	 polemical	 object(s)?	 Heraclius	 is	 obviously	 Julian’s	 prime	
target.	It	has	been	suggested,	however,	that	this	oration	is	also	directed	against	
Julian’s	archenemies,	the	Christians.	In	fact,	as	we	shall	see	shortly,	Heraclius	is	




however,	 too	 readily	 conclude	 from	 this	 that	 Julian	 does	 not	 differentiate	
between	Cynics	and	Christians.12	I	suggest	 that	 the	situation	 is	somewhat	more	
complex.	 As	 we	 noted,	 polemics	 were	 a	 traditional	 tool	 used	 by	 ancient	
philosophers	 for	self-presentation	and	self-promotion.	As	 I	 shall	explain	below,	
this	 is	 precisely	 the	 purpose	 of	 Julian’s	 oration.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 Julian’s	 time,	
polemics	 –	 however	 useful	 they	 might	 once	 have	 been	 in	 the	 competition	
between	various	philosophical	schools	–	had	become	a	liability.	Christian	authors	
exploited	 the	 polemical	 activities	 of	 pagan	 philosophical	 schools	 in	 their	 own	
polemics	against	their	pagan	opponents.	The	disagreements	(diaphônia)	among	
pagan	philosophers,	which	they	themselves	had	so	enthusiastically	underscored	
in	 their	 public	 polemical	 exchanges,	 compared	 unfavourably	 to	 the	 harmony	
among	 Christians	 in	 doctrinal	 matters	 –	 or	 so	 the	 Christian	 authors	 claimed.	
Eusebius	of	Caesarea,	to	give	but	one	example,	compares	the	quarrelsome	pagan	
philosophers	 to	 “boxers	who	 eagerly	 exchange	 blows	 as	 on	 a	 stage	 before	 the	
spectators”	and	to	warriors	who	strike	and	are	struck	“by	the	spears	and	various	
weapons	 of	 their	 wordy	 war.”	 The	 latter	 image	 evokes	 the	 duels	 of	 Homeric	
warriors,	 which	 were	 fought	 with	 spears.	 Thus	 Eusebius,	 no	 doubt	 quite	
consciously,	 evokes	 the	 language	 in	 which	 Platonic	 polemicists	 –	 such	 as	
Numenius,	Plutarch,	and	Porphyry	–	had	described	the	polemical	confrontations	
between	Greek	philosophical	schools.	13	
Julian,	 as	 an	 experienced	 combatant	 in	 pagan-Christian	 polemical	 warfare,	
knew	this	anti-pagan	line	only	too	well.	He	must	have	realised	that,	in	attacking	a	
philosopher	from	another	pagan	school	of	thought,	he	made	himself	vulnerable	




12	For	 an	 argument	 against	 the	 suggestion	 that	 Heraclius	 was	 a	 covert	 Christian,	 see	 J.H.W.G.	
Liebeschuetz,	 “Julian’s	 Hymn	 to	 the	 Mother	 of	 the	 Gods:	 The	 Revival	 and	 Justification	 of	
Traditional	 Religion,”	 in	 Emperor	 and	 Author:	 The	 Writings	 of	 Julian	 the	 Apostate,	 edited	 by	
Nicholas	 Barker-Brian	 and	 Sean	 Toughers	 (Swansea:	 Classical	 Press	 of	Wales,	 2003),	 213–27,	
here	218–19.	










What	 strenuous	 discipline	 have	 you	 ever	 embraced?	 What	 have	 you	
ever	done	to	make	you	worthy	of	the	staff	of	Diogenes	or	still	more	of	





Thus	far,	 Julian,	by	exposing	his	polemical	object	as	a	 fake	philosopher,	 follows	
the	 pattern	 we	 found	 in	 other	 polemics.	 Moreover,	 in	 distinguishing	 between	







is	 apotaktitai,	 a	 name	 applied	 to	 certain	 persons	 by	 the	 impious	
Galilaeans.	 They	 are	 for	 the	 most	 part	 men	 who	 by	 making	 small	
sacrifices	 gain	 much	 or	 rather	 everything	 from	 all	 sources,	 and	 in	








15	Julian	 (The	Works,	 Volume	 II),	 trans.	 Wright,	 123.	 Elm	 (Sons	 of	 Hellenism,	110)	 argues	 that	








the	 Christians,	 has	 placed	 himself	 outside	 of	 that	 tradition	 in	 order	 to	make	 a	
quick	 buck.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Julian	 stresses	 the	 harmony	 within	 the	 pagan	







his	 analysis	 of	 polemics,	 a	 polemical	 theme	 “has	 to	 be	 controversial	 and	 an	




“Philosophical	 polemics”	 (as	 distinct	 from	 philosophical	
argumentation)	 enter	 the	 philosophical	 scene	 when	 ultimate	
convictions	 are	 at	 stake.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 is	 fully	
understandable	 that	 individuals	 come	 under	 attack.	 For	 values	 are	
always	 embodied	 in	 certain	 individuals	 or	 groups	 of	 individuals,	 and	
what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 not	 only	 the	 preservation	 of	 one’s	 life	 but,	 even,	
especially	 in	the	Christian	world,	 the	salvation	of	one’s	soul.	These	are	

















Pan	 or	 Zeus,	 as	 though	 we	 would	 ascribe	 to	 these	 gods	 our	 human	
understanding?”	(Julian,	Oration	7.208b–c).18	Later	on	in	his	oration,	Julian	goes	





For	 Julian	 and	 his	 followers,	 Christianity	 is	 synonymous	 with	 atheism.	 The	
issue	of	atheism	is	discussed	by	one	Salustius	in	his	treatise	On	the	Gods	and	the	
Cosmos.	This	Salustius	was	a	 fervent	supporter	of	 Julian’s	pagan	restoration.	 In	
fact,	Julian	explicitly	mentions	him	as	one	of	his	friends,	who	was	present	when	
both	Heraclius	and	Julian	delivered	their	orations	(223b).	Salustius	explains	the	
rise	 of	 atheism	 –	 that	 is,	 of	 Christianity	 –	 as	 follows:	 “Furthermore,	 it	 is	 not	
unlikely	 that	 atheism	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 punishment.	 For	 it	 is	 reasonable	 that	 people	
who	knew	the	gods	and	spurned	 them	will	be	deprived	of	 that	knowledge	 in	a	
next	life.	And	justice	demanded	that	those	who	honoured	their	own	kings	as	gods	
became	unaware	of	the	gods	themselves”	(Salustius,	On	the	Gods	18.3).	Salustius	
here	hints	at	 the	 theory	of	 the	(pagan)	author	Euhemerus	of	Messene	(third	 to	
fourth	 century	 BCE),	 who	 had	 suggested	 that	 the	 gods	 of	 old	 were	 divinised	






&	Translation	 [Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1926],	 lxxxix)	 picks	 up	 the	 critique	 of	
euhemerism	in	this	passage.	He	does	not,	however,	connect	it	to	the	role	that	euhemerism	plays	




the	punishment	 inflicted	upon	him	and	his	 followers	by	 the	gods.	On	 the	other	
hand,	Salustius	turns	the	tables	on	his	Christian	critics.	The	impious	Euhemerus	
and	his	followers	were	not	part	of	the	pagan	community	at	all;	they	were	in	fact	
future	 Christians.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 understandable	why	 divine	 names	 are	 a	
thing	 of	 value	 for	 Julian	 and	 his	 pagan	 friends.	 It	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 claim	 to	 be	 a	
mortal	descendent	of	the	immortal	gods,	as	Julian	did;	it	is	quite	another	thing	to	
identify	 oneself	 with	 the	 immortal	 gods	 when	 one	 is	 merely	 human.	 It	 is	
precisely	this	error	that	has	caused	–	in	Julian’s	analysis,	at	least	–	the	decline	of	














the	 same	 time,	 they	 started	 demolishing	 the	 ancestral	 pagan	 temples	 and	
replacing	them	with	sepulchres.	(One	assumes	that	here	Julian	is	referring	to	the	
Christian	veneration	of	the	relics	of	saints	and	martyrs.)	The	chaos	becomes	such	
that	 the	 (pagan)	 gods	 decide	 to	 interfere.	 Zeus	 instructs	 Helios	 and	 Athena	 to	
care	for	a	young	cousin	of	the	rich	man.	This	young	man	then	finds	himself	at	a	
deserted	spot,	wondering	what	path	to	take	in	life.	This	situation	alludes	to	the	
famous	myth	 of	 the	 young	Heracles	 at	 the	 crossroads	 –	 one	 of	 the	myths	 that	
Julian	 had	 previously	 held	 up	 to	 Heraclius	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	 good	 myth,	 as	
opposed	 to	 Heraclius’s	 own	 blasphemous	 story.	Whereas	 Heracles	 is	 made	 to	










not	 know	whether	 this	 is	 a	 true	 story	 (alêthês	 logos)	 or	 a	myth	 (mythos).	 It	 is	




Julian’s	 as	 a	Platonic	 “noble	 lie.”21	This	would	help	make	 sense	of	 the	question	
Julian	 leaves	 dangling	 in	 the	 air	 regarding	 the	 truth	 of	 this	 story.	 As	 is	 well	
known,	 in	 the	Republic	 (414b–415d),	Plato	defends	 the	 idea	 that	 the	state	may	
tell	 lies	 in	 the	public	 interest.	 Such	 tales	are	 false,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	never	
happened,	 yet	 they	 resemble	 the	 truth	 in	 that	 they	 contain	 valuable	 moral	
lessons.	 Julian’s	 learned	 public	 will	 no	 doubt	 have	 picked	 up	 the	 allusion	 and	
worked	out	for	themselves	that	even	though	the	event	as	such	did	not	take	place,	
the	story	supposedly	contained	some	truth.		
In	Plato,	 the	 function	of	 the	noble	myth	 is	 to	make	 the	population	of	Plato’s	
ideal	state	accept	its	rather	undemocratic	arrangement.	Julian’s	myth	appears	to	




the	 school,	who	 is	 thus	 raised	 to	 a	 place	 of	 prominence	within	 the	 school.	We	
noted	that,	by	contrast,	Julian	seemed	to	engage	in	a	polemical	encounter	on	his	







With	 this	 attack	on	 the	Cynic	Heraclius,	 Julian	addresses	 the	 fence-sitters	 at	
court,	 rather	 than	 hard-core	 Cynics	 and	 Christians.	 These	 members	 of	 the	
imperial	court	are	urged	to	pick	sides	in	a	Manichean	battle	between	pagan	light	
and	Christian	darkness.	Are	they	willing	to	join	Julian’s	campaign,	not	just	for	a	









and	pagan	mythology	 to	win	his	 favour,	as	Heraclius	may	have	hoped.	 Instead,	
they	should	aim	for	a	purified	version	of	Greek	literature	and	philosophy.	If	not,	
they	are	no	better	than	the	Christians,	with	whom	Julian	associates	Heraclius.	He	
is	 the	 cunning	 flatterer	 “who	 assumes	 the	 frankness	 (parrhêsia)	 of	 a	 friend,”	
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